Former PM escapes blame for ‘sexed up’ intelligence report into Saddam’s non-existent WMDs
Former PM slammed but let off hook for weapons intelligence
TONY Blair has been slammed in the Chilcot report for a catalogue of failings over the Iraq war – but has dodged a bullet over the infamous ‘Dodgy Dossier’.
He and former spin doctor Alastair Campbell were accused of a cover-up over the dossier detailing Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
Chilcot's report damns the campaign as “a very long way from success”, claims Blair rushed into war and casts doubt on the legality of the military action.
It also said he failed to recognise the terrorist threat a war would create and failed to work with the US to develop a post-war plan.
But it stopped short of condemning him for the ‘sexed-up dossier’ that alleged Iraq was armed and dangerous.
The report includes discussions between Blair and President Bush in which he urged them to stress the "persuasive" link between Iraq and Al Qaeda.
Chilcot criticised security experts who compiled the report for not being clear in their presentation of the facts - and ministers for not challenging it.
In the dossier - titled “Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government" - the former PM claimed Iraq had WMDs ready for use within 45 minutes of a strike order.
This was used as the smoking gun to justify a war that thousands opposed.
Blair said at the time: “At some point in the future that threat would become a reality.”
Unveiling his report, Sir John Chilcot said: "In the House of Commons September 24, 2002, Mr Blair presented Iraq's past, present and future capabilities as evidence of the potential threat from Iraq's WMD."
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He said the dossier was presented "with a certainty that was not justified."
Chilcot added: "The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt that either Iraq had continued to produce chemical weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.
"The committee has also judged that as long as sanctions remained effective Iraq could not develop a nuclear weapon and that it would take several years to develop and deploy long range missiles."
He added: "The Government strategy reflected its confidence in the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments.
"Those assessments provided the bench mark against which Iraq's conduct and denials, and the report of the inspectors, were judged.
"As late as March 17 2003 Mr Blair was being advised by the chairman that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them.
"He was also told that the evidence pointed to Saddam Hussain's view that the the capability was militarily significant and his determination, left to his own device,s to build it up further.
"It is now clear that policy on Iraq was based on flawed intelligence."
Blair and his team have been accused of distorting his words and ‘sexing up’ the evidence.
The Chilcot report has extracts of correspondence between Blair and Bush in which the former PM urges them to stress the WMD evidence and "the Al Qaida link".
Mr Blair added: "It will be hugely persuasive over here."
Mr Chilcot added: “We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted.
“Military action at that time was not a last resort.
“We have also concluded that the judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were presented with a certainty that was not justified.
“Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated.
“The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.
“The government failed to achieve its stated objectives.”
Blair remained defiant after the report unveiling.
He told Press Association he would take "full responsibility for any mistakes" but still believed "it was better to remove Saddam Hussein".
He added the decision to invade Iraq was taken "in good faith and in what I believed to be the best interests of the country".
Iraq Inquiry: the key events leading up to the publication of Sir John Chilcot’s report into the UK's war in Iraq
June 15 2009: Prime Minister Gordon Brown announces the establishment of the inquiry to identify lessons that can be learned from the Iraq war, with Sir John Chilcot confirmed as chair of the panel
July 30 2009: Sir John Chilcot launches the inquiry, saying that he will hold as many public meetings as possible and that the panel "will not shy away from making criticism"
November 24 2009: Public hearings commence
January 12 2010: Alastair Campbell denies he sought to "beef up" the government's dossier on Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction
January 18, 2010: Jonathan Powell, Chief of staff to Tony Blair, denies an attempt was made to "bully" attorney general Lord Goldsmith into authorising the war
January 21, 2010: Jack Straw, former Foreign Secretary, admits to the inquiry that he only "very reluctantly" came round to supporting the invasion of Iraq
January 29, 2010: A defiant Tony Blair tells the inquiry that he has no regrets over removing Saddam Hussein and would do the same again
March 5, 2010: Gordon Brown expresses his sorrow for the loss of life in the conflict in Iraq while insisting it had been the "right decision" to overthrow Saddam Hussein
July 30, 2010: Sir John Prescott discloses to the panel that he privately harboured doubts about the intelligence used to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003
January 18, 2011: Sir John Chilcot says the inquiry is "disappointed" that it cannot publish the notes Mr Blair sent to President George W Bush nor the records of their discussions
January 21, 2011: Blair is recalled to the inquiry where he is jeered and heckled by relatives in the hearing room as he said he "deeply and profoundly" regretted the loss of life in the Iraq War
February 2, 2011: At the last public hearing, Straw tells the inquiry that just days before the invasion of Iraq he advised Blair that they need not necessarily send in British troops with the Americans
November 16, 2011: The Iraq Inquiry says it will not publish the report until summer of 2012 - a delay of six months - because of a wrangling over the release of secret documents
July 13, 2012: Sir John Chilcot writes to David Cameron alerting him that the report will be delayed until the middle of 2013 once a process of 'Maxwellisation' is completed
January 20, 2015: Sir John Chilcot writes to David Cameron confirming that there is "no realistic prospect" of delivering the report before the general election in May
October 28, 2015: Sir John Chilcot writes to Mr Cameron setting out a timetable for completion of the report
May 6, 2016: The chairman of the inquiry writes again to the Prime Minister, this time confirming a date for publication of July 6, 2016
July 6, 2016: The inquiry committee intends to publish the Report of the Iraq Inquiry. It will include all but the most sensitive information which could threaten national security
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